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Abstract 
A lively debate emerged on the proposed “Connected Continent” legislative package presented by the European 
Commission in September 2013. The package contains a proposed rule on the ‘open Internet’, which was heavily 
discussed in European Parliament hearings in early December. This commentary argues that while the proposed 
rule is  in  principle  balanced  and  appealing,  it  is utterly  impractical  due  to  the  enormous  uncertainty  that  its 
application would entail. At the same time, the rule is very far from what neutrality proponents have argued for 
almost a decade: rather than the place for internet freedom, it would transform the Web into a place requiring 
constant micro-management and tutoring of user behaviour. Both arguments lead to the conclusion that the current 
proposal should be at once reformed and analysed under a more holistic lens. On the one hand, Europe should 
launch an ambitious project for the future, converged infrastructure by mobilising resources and reforming rules to 
encourage investment into ubiquitous, converged, ‘always on’ connectivity. On the other hand, enhanced legal 
certainty  for  broadband  investment  could  justify  a  more  neutrality-oriented  approach  to  traffic  management 
practices on the Internet. The author proposes a new approach to Internet regulation which, altogether, will lead to a 
more balanced and sustainable model for the future, without jeopardising user freedom. 
 
he  “Connected  Continent”  package 
presented  by  the  European  Commission 
on  11  September  2013  promises  a 
significant change of direction compared to the 
previous e-communications framework adopted 
at the EU level in 2002 and revised in 2009, but 
also  significantly  complemented  by  additional 
layers  of  regulation  (e.g.  on  international 
roaming)  over  time.  The  Commission  attempts 
(for  the  third  time,  after  2001  and  2006-07)  to 
acquire  a  stronger  control  over  remedies 
proposed  by  national  regulators,  and  to  foster 
more pan-European coordination in the award of 
spectrum in key bands (such as the 700Mhz and 
800Mhz bands). Both proposals are likely to meet 
substantial hostility in the European Parliament 
– where the package has been recently discussed 
in  public  hearings  both  by  the  ITRE  and  the 
IMCO  Committees  –  and  most  notably  in  the 
Council,  which  can  easily  be  defined  as  the 
strongest  opposition  to  further  delegation  of 
regulatory  competences  to  the  EU  level  in  this 
field. And at the same time, even before being 
diluted  during  the  legislative  procedure,  both 
proposals  already  appear  too  ‘shy’  to  really 
trigger  the  shift  of  gear  that  Vice  President 
Neelie Kroes has announced for the remainder of 
her mandate.  
Against  this  background,  remarkable 
prominence  has  been  given  to  a  proposal 
contained in the package, which addresses with 
more  emphasis  than  before,  the  issue  –  once 
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termed as “irrelevant” for Europe – of net(work) 
neutrality,  i.e.  the  principle  based  on  which 
Internet  Service  Providers  (ISPs)  should  not  be 
allowed to inspect the packets of data (bits) that 
flow on their networks, and accordingly should 
not be able to block any application or content 
(with the exception, widely recognised, of spam 
filtering), and should not be allowed to prioritise 
or  degrade  the  speed  of  any  packet.  Likewise, 
ISPs,  under  mandatory  net  neutrality 
regulations, would not be allowed to create ‘toll 
lanes’  on  the  Internet  by  offering  guaranteed 
Quality of Service (QoS) to some application or 
content  providers  in  exchange  for  a  fee:  as  a 
result,  forms  of  product  differentiation  such  as 
those  available  in  many  other  sectors  (think 
about  the  various  levels  of  service  offered  by 
airlines,  or  by  express  couriers)  would  not  be 
allowed  on  the  Internet,  at  least  at  the 
infrastructure layer (see Renda, 2010b).  
Endorsing this principle, many argue, would be 
the first and foremost pillar that guarantees that 
the Internet remains ‘open’, i.e. an environment 
in which end users can access any content, any 
time,  anywhere  and  from  any  device  without 
being  inspected  or  manipulated  by  their  ISPs. 
This,  in  turn,  is  said  to  represent  an  essential 
precondition for the Internet to allow freedom of 
expression  and  pluralism:  not  only  the 
possibility  of  shaping  or  blocking  traffic  might 
lead  ISPs  to  place  in  a  ‘dirt  track’  applications 
that  do  not  have  enough  resources  to  acquire 
minimum, guarantee quality of service; but the 
possibility  of  inspecting  packets  of  data  might 
also  easily  offer  an  opportunity  to  exercise 
censorship  and  jeopardise  the  extraordinary 
potential of the Internet as a means of enhancing 
democracy. 
Following these considerations, countries such as 
the  Netherlands,  France,  Slovenia  and  –  to  a 
more  limited  extent  –  the  United  States  have 
adopted legislation that seeks to carve in stone 
the  principle  of  net  neutrality,  thus  making  it 
almost  impossible  for  a  network  operator  to 
manage  traffic  on  its  own  infrastructure. 
However,  other  countries  (e.g.  the  UK)  have 
taken a completely different approach, claiming 
that  the  creation  of  ‘toll  lanes’  (termed 
specialised  services)  on  the  Internet  might 
provide  ISPs  with  an  opportunity  to  monetise 
their investment in new, high-speed networks.  
Net neutrality in the Connected 
Continent: Five syndromes to avoid 
In  this  fragmented  regulatory  scenario,  the 
European Commission has proposed a rule that 
seeks to strike a balance between these opposing 
stances.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Connected 
Continent package recognises that net neutrality 
is “what keeps the Internet open”, and as such 
should be the default principle for all ISPs in the 
EU28. On the other hand, however, the proposed 
rule  leaves  the  door  open  to  the  creation  of 
‘specialised  services’  through  agreements 
between ISPs and application/content providers, 
under  the  condition  that  such services  “do not 
disrupt the open Internet”. This, in turn, means 
that national regulators should monitor Internet 
traffic and enforce remedies whenever they see 
that ISPs are degrading the level of service for 
the  end  users  on  the  ‘open  Internet’  below  a 
certain level of quality.  
With  the  exception  of  some  neutrality 
‘extremists’, who do not recognise any merit in 
the  creation  of  specialised  services,  to  the 
majority  of  commentators  the  proposal  looks 
balanced and commendable. Also the European 
Parliament’s  IMCO  Committee,  though 
replacing net neutrality with a reference to the 
“open  Internet”,  is  essentially  in  line  with  the 
Commission’s approach. However, the proposal 
raises a number of concerns, which will have to 
be fully addressed already at the adoption stage, 
if the proposed rule is to generate any benefit for 
European  net-surfers.  I  address  these  concerns 
below, by referring to five ‘syndromes’, which I 
call the ‘first legislate, then think’ syndrome, the 
Galileo  syndrome,  the  Trabant  syndrome,  the 
‘keys  and  lamp  post’  syndrome  and  the 
Stockholm syndrome.  
Syndrome no. 1: First legislate, then 
think 
Good regulatory practice requires that legislators 
think  about  the  ease  of  implementation  of 
proposed  rules  in  practice,  before  deciding 
whether to adopt them. Pity that this practice is 
very seldom followed in Brussels, also due to the 
fact  that  implementation,  enforcement  and 
compliance take place at a much later stage and 
under  the  competence  of  national  authorities, 
rather  than  EU  institutions.  Accordingly,  it  is 
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theoretically  optimal  in  Brussels  become  very 
impractical when it comes to interpretation and 
implementation.  
The existing EU rules on net neutrality, included 
in  2009  in  Arts  20  and  22  of  the  amended 
Universal  Service  Obligations  (USO)  Directive, 
are  a  good  example  of  close-to-inapplicable 
provisions.  First,  Art.  20  of  the  USO  Directive 
mandates  that  network  operators  that  manage 
traffic should inform end users in a transparent 
way of the practices they adopt, so that users can 
make  an  informed  choice  when  deciding 
whether  to  subscribe.  However,  the  rule  says 
nothing about the way in which consumers will 
be  informed:  a  thick  manual  of  traffic-shaping 
practices  drafted  by  the  company’s  engineers 
would not help the average end user very much, 
I  fear.  Economists have  argued since  the  1960s 
that  consumers  cannot  be  asked  to  gain  full 
information about the specifics of a given service 
(George  Stigler  argued  back  in  1961  that 
“rational  ignorance”  is  to  be  expected  in  these 
cases).  Accordingly,  a  synthetic,  easy-to-grasp 
way  of  signalling  the  amount  and  type  of 
restrictions  or  shaping  that  occur  on  a  given 
network  should  be  elaborated  and  offered  to 
consumers in the form of a ‘traffic lights’ system 
or  similar  arrangement.  Legislators  have  not 
thought about this, nor has the industry come up 
with a proposal to address the problem, and the 
rule has remained to date almost unapplied.  
Even more importantly, Art. 22 USO introduced 
the  possibility  for  national  regulators  to 
intervene  and  impose  a  “minimum  quality  of 
service”  level  in  case  the  quality  of  certain 
applications became unacceptable for end users, 
arguably due to traffic management practices. As 
a matter of fact, this rule is the predecessor of the 
current  proposal  to  empower  regulators  to 
intervene  whenever  specialised  services 
significantly impair the functioning of the ‘open 
Internet’.  
But  what  does  it  mean  to significantly  impair? 
And what does it mean to reduce the quality of 
service  to  an  unacceptable  level?  Quality  of 
service  inevitably  means  a  different  thing  for 
different  services  and  for  different  users.  Since 
the speed and quality of delivery depends on the 
congestion found by the packets of data on the 
network,  quality  will  also  change  across  the 
territory and will differ at any given moment in 
time in different postal codes, neighbourhoods, 
buildings.  How  can  national  regulators  patrol 
the Internet and provide an instant interpretation 
of all cases in which a given service has become 
too slow or low-quality for the end users? And 
what is the threshold of speed and quality that 
should be applied? 
In  a  nutshell,  the  existing  rules  are  impractical 
and  the  newly  proposed  rule  will  face  even 
bigger  problems  of  implementation, 
interpretation,  discretion  at  local  level,  further 
fragmenting regulatory approaches in the single 
market. This despite the fact that the Connected 
Continent package aims at further strengthening 
the  Single  Market.  Accordingly,  a  key  issue 
should  be  addressed  by  the  EU  institutions  in 
charge of the dossier: since the current rules on 
net  neutrality  are  almost  impossible  to  apply, 
how  are  they  going  to  fix  the  problem  before 
they  adopt  the  new  proposal  on  specialised 
services? 
Syndrome no. 2 (Galileo syndrome): 
You build the pipes, they call the tune? 
A  few  years  ago,  in  2007,  the  European 
Parliament had to cast a dramatic vote in a tense 
session dedicated to the Galileo project, aimed at 
creating a satellite system that would support EU 
communications (the so-called ‘European GPS’). 
The  Parliament’s  vote  was  aimed  at  deciding 
whether the amount of public funding devoted 
to  Galileo  could  be  tripled  compared  to  the 
original budget – this meant an additional €2.4 
billion. What had happened? The story, in short, 
is  simply  explained:  the  private  sector  had 
initially declared its interest in joining the huge 
new  project,  aiming  to  develop  enticing 
commercial  services  for  consumers  and  secure 
long-term  contracts  for  military  applications. 
However,  the  European  Commission  had  later 
informed  them  that,  at  least  initially,  no 
commercial  services  nor  military  applications 
were  envisaged  on  Galileo,  only  civilian  use  – 
hence the decision to withdraw participation.  
The  Galileo  syndrome  reminds  us  of  the 
tendency  of  EU  policymakers  to  assume  that 
private players will do things just because they 
have  the  responsibility  to  do  them,  and  not 
because  a  suitable  business  case  for  certain 
investment  exists.  Similarly,  the  debate  on  net 
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Agenda  has  often  taken  investment  incentives 
for granted. On the contrary, however, the EU is 
currently in a situation of profound impasse for 
what  concerns  the  deployment  of  new,  high-
speed,  high-capacity  broadband  infrastructure, 
whether fixed or wireless. This mostly occurred 
due  to  the  application  of  a  rule  conceived  for 
narrowband telecoms (mandatory sharing of the 
network infrastructure with new entrants) to the 
broadband  world,  before  the  infrastructure  was 
actually  built.  Today,  Europe  finds  itself  with 
very  limited  coverage  of  very-high-speed 
broadband,  and  the  need  to  provide 
telecommunications  operators  with  some 
incentives to deploy optical fibre networks. 
Faced  with  this  emergency  situation,  the 
Commission turned to its net neutrality proposal 
as  one  of  the  only  opportunities  left  to  allow 
some monetisation of the upcoming investments 
in  optical  fibre.  The  rationale  is  easy  to 
understand: if internet providers know that they 
will be able to charge application providers for 
quality  of  service  when  setting  up  so-called 
‘specialised services’, then they will count on an 
additional  source  of  revenue,  and  might 
eventually  decide  to  deploy  high-speed 
broadband;  otherwise,  full  net  neutrality  will 
leave  us  with  a  simple  dilemma:  to  build 
networks,  share  them  with  new  entrants  at 
regulated  prices  and  make  them  available  for 
free to application providers that compete with 
them  in  some services  (SMS,  voice  calls);  or  to 
leave things as they stand, and enjoy the current 
situation a bit longer. What would you choose? 
Syndrome no. 3 (Trabant syndrome): 
 Is standardisation synonymous with 
democracy? 
Another  problem  that  emerged  in  the  net 
neutrality debate in Brussels is the tendency to 
equate  neutrality  and  democracy  with 
standardisation  of  services.  From  consumer 
organisations  to  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament,  the  temptation  to  advertise  a  fully 
“open” and “neutral” Internet as something that 
would serve the interest of the end users seems 
too strong to resist. The underlying idea is that, if 
bits  are  not  discriminated  on  the  Internet,  end 
users  will  have  the  possibility  to  access  all 
services  and  content  they  wish,  through  any 
device,  anywhere,  any  time.  In  my  opinion, 
under  current  conditions  this  assumption  is 
heroic  at  best.  To  the  contrary,  a  fully 
standardised,  neutral,  unmanaged  Internet 
would  serve  users’  interests  just  as  the  grey 
“Trabant”  served  consumer  preferences  in 
Eastern Germany under the Communist regime. 
Since  no  one  should  be  discriminated  against, 
let’s  give  a  bad,  affordable  car  to  everybody, 
with no possibility of upgrade.  
Likewise, the absence of traffic management on 
the  Internet  and  the  absence  of  specialised 
services  in  the  future  means  that  all  traffic, 
regardless  of  its  need  for  timely  delivery,  will 
face  the  same  traffic  jam.  It  also  means  that 
consumers who wish to use the internet for very 
light  applications  (e.g.  social  networking)  will 
subsidise  heavy  Internet  users,  since  there  is 
limited  possibility  to  charge  separately  for 
bandwidth-intensive  uses.  And  it  also  means 
that  some  services  –  from  remote  health 
monitoring to IPTV – will never take off due to 
the  impossibility  to  guarantee  any  minimum 
quality of service. Quality will always depend on 
how  much  traffic  there  is  on  the  information 
superhighway:  no  toll  lanes,  no  guaranteed 
arrival time. How do you like it? 
One  potential  counter-argument  is  that  even 
with neutrality obligations for ISPs, the Internet 
will remain an extraordinarily lively playground 
in which application and content providers will 
manage to engage in product differentiation for 
the benefit of the end users. I turn to this issue in 
the next section.  
Syndrome no. 4 (Keys and lamp post 
syndrome): What about other layers of 
the Internet? 
A  recurrent  fallacy  occurs  when  policymakers 
craft  legal  rules  without  adopting  a  holistic, 
comprehensive  view  of  the  problem.  This 
reminds me of the man that was found looking 
for his car keys under a lamp post at night: when 
asked whether he had lost his car keys nearby 
the lamp post, he replies “no, but this is the only 
place where there is some light!”  
If  the  ultimate  problem  that  would  trigger 
mandatory net neutrality obligations is that end 
users are entitled to a non-manipulated content 
and non-filtered applications, then policymakers 
should  realise  that  the  real  restrictions  to 
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layers  of  the  Internet  architecture,  where 
platform  competition  leads  to  reductions  of 
interoperability, most often to the benefit of the 
end user. For example, applications that run on 
Apple’s  iOS  are  not  portable  to  the  Android 
ecosystem,  and  neither  platform  communicates 
with  Windows.  Apple  has  for  a  long  time 
refused to accept Adobe Flash applications based 
on security and quality concerns: this means that 
Apple users will not have access to a number of 
applications powered by Flash. 
In a nutshell, the application layer of the Internet 
is  increasingly  non-neutral:  a  recent  paper  co-
authored by one of the inventors of the internet, 
David Clarke, shows clearly that the architecture 
of  the  ‘network  of  networks’  has  become  a 
conglomerate  of  sometimes  open,  sometimes 
proprietary  platforms  that  are  interlinked  –. 
almost  the  opposite  of  neutrality.  Is  this  a 
problem? Not necessarily, since the possibility to 
fence,  at  least  partly,  one’s  own  ecosystem 
provide  more  incentives  to  invest  in  new 
platforms.  Imposing  neutrality  and 
interoperability  obligations  on,  say,  Apple  will 
probably  be  welfare-reducing  for  consumers  in 
the  long  run.  Is  this  a  problem  for  innovation 
and  entry  of  new  players  (the  so-called  “next 
Facebook”  argument)?  Again,  no:  the  current 
rhetoric in Brussels is that only the open Internet 
will enable ease of entry for European start-ups. 
But in reality, some of the most successful start-
ups  in  recent  years  in  Europe  –  for  example, 
Rovio  entertainment  –  have  found  their  way 
towards consumers through Apple’s App Store, 
not exactly the open internet. All this since it is in 
the interest of large platform operators to exploit 
indirect  network  externalities  and  provide  to 
their  end  users  the  largest  possible  variety  of 
applications and content.  
A similar logic can be applied to search engines, 
a hot topic on which the European Commission 
seems  determined  to  impose  new  forms  of 
neutrality.  The  current  Google  antitrust 
investigation is leading the giant IT company to 
propose new ways of showing results to the end 
users, which are apparently more ‘neutral’ and 
echo  the  rather  unfortunate  ‘ballot  screen’ 
imposed on Microsoft a few years ago after the 
‘Opera’  investigation  by  the  European 
Commission. Without entering into the merits of 
the Google investigation (I promise to get back to 
it soon in another piece), what stands out as the 
“elephant in the room” is that a neutral search 
engine is not going to be very useful for the end 
users. The fact that on the Internet “a wealth of 
information  creates  a  poverty  of  attention” 
(Herbert Simon) determines the success of those 
companies, like Google, that can retrieve results 
that  match  the  needs  of  its  end  users  Forcing 
Google to behave ‘neutrally’ would mean asking 
the company to significantly worsen its product, 
to the benefit of nobody in the long run. Another 
case in which the ‘Trabant syndrome’ is likely to 
surface  (I  will  get  back  to  this  issue  in  more 
detail in a future commentary in early 2014).  
Syndrome no. 5 (Stockholm syndrome): 
I love my captor! 
The  debate  on  net  neutrality  started  in  the 
United States after the Madison River decision by 
the FCC and rapidly became an epochal battle to 
defend the rights of the end users to access all 
content and, as the flip side of the coin, not to be 
censored on the Web. The Dynamic Coalition for 
Net  Neutrality,  recently  created  at  the  Internet 
Governance  Forum  in  Bali,  approaches  the 
neutrality  problem  from  a  fundamental  rights 
perspective, defining neutrality as a key driver of 
freedom  of  expression.  This  is  certainly  a 
powerful argument: a ‘dumb’ network is one in 
which  no  one  can  inspect  and  block 
communications  on  the  basis  of  their  content, 
and  as  a  result  no  one  can  block  ‘undesired’ 
content.  Not  surprisingly,  many  governments 
around the world that exercise censorship on a 
daily  basis  (China,  Iran,  Pakistan  and  many 
others)  would  not  want  to  see  this  form  of 
neutrality  endorsed  at  the  international  level, 
and  this  explains  many  of  their  attempts  to 
increase  government  control  of  Internet 
governance  (including,  most  notably,  the 
proposals  filed  by  Russia,  China  and  other 
countries  at  the  WCIT  conference  in  Bali  one 
year ago).  
So far, so good: but is the Commission’s proposal 
on net neutrality really endorsing this principle? 
To me, it appears as if the Commission is indeed 
proposing  a  different  policy  measure. It  is  like 
end users were told “since we want to make sure 
that  no  one  controls  you  and  discriminates 
against you, we will watch you constantly, every 
day,  every  minute,  and  will  inspect  all 
communications that flow to and from your IP 
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certain  levels  –  national  regulators  will 
immediately intervene”.  How aligned with the 
original sentiments towards net neutrality is this 
approach?  
In my opinion, the proposal would create a huge 
monitoring  system  for  Internet  traffic:  in  the 
Datagate  era,  it  is  ironic  to  see  neutrality 
advocates support a proposal that enables even 
more  patrolling  of  what  end  users  do.  As  a 
result,  the  debate  boils  down  to  an  uneasy 
dilemma: either ISPs will inspect you, or public 
authorities will – the same public authorities that 
have spied on you and e-tapped you for years, 
while  defending  net  neutrality  in  international 
fora. Have we end users fallen in love with our 
captors, or what? 
Away from rhetoric, into tragic choices: 
Connected Continent and the dynamic 
nature of the Internet 
As clarified above, it is at once meaningless and 
impossible to discuss the proposed rule on net 
neutrality without considering at the same time 
the  broader  picture  of  the  development  of  the 
Internet  ecosystem  in  the  EU,  and  the  ease  of 
implementation of the rule. First, looking at the 
ICT ecosystem, it is important to observe that the 
Internet  has  become  a  complex  conundrum  of 
various  types  of  infrastructures  and  platforms 
that  operate  across  the  original  architecture  of 
the network of networks, and often violate the 
original principle of separation of layers (Claffy 
& Clark, 2013). The more complex and rich the 
Internet ecosystem becomes, the more end users 
seem to feel the need for someone to guide them 
through  the  Web  –  hereby  the  role  played  by 
gatekeepers  and  platform  operators,  which 
normally  extensively  violate  the  principle  of 
neutrality on their platforms, most often to the 
benefit of the end users. This new ecosystem is 
key to the future of our economies: the more we 
delegate  key  daily  activities  to  the  ‘connected 
infrastructure’ (think about cloud computing, or 
smart  cities),  the  more  we  need  that 
infrastructure  to  be  in  place,  always  on  and 
resilient. This calls for urgent action to stimulate 
the deployment of infrastructure in Europe.  
However, current data are not very encouraging: 
not  only  does  the  deployment  of  high-speed 
fixed  broadband  seem  too  slow  to  meet  the 
targets of the Digital Agenda, but revenues are 
steeply declining for EU telecoms operators, with 
an  expected  10%  reduction  despite  a  projected 
900%  increase  in  Internet  traffic  in  the  2006-16 
decade,  according  to  European  Commission 
data. And also in the mobile sector, which will be 
a  key  driver  of  growth  in  the  years  to  come, 
Europe is doing badly thanks to a killer mix of 
uncoordinated  spectrum  policy  and  lack  of 
clarity  and  certainty  as  regards  neutrality. 
According to a recent study by CTIA, “the level 
of wireless capital expenditures in the US grew 
more  than  70%  between  2007  and  2013,  while 
declining in the EU”. The difference in spending 
was such that “by the end of 2013, nearly 20% of 
US  connections  will  be  on  4G  (LTE)  networks 
compared to less than 2% in the EU”. The gap in 
the  speed  of  connection  is  already  huge  (US 
users surf at double the speed of EU users) and 
likely to widen in the coming years. And almost 
ironically,  in  the  US  mobile  prices  are  sharply 
declining and the average revenues per minute is 
less  than  one-third  that  the  European  average. 
As  a  result,  between  2007  and  2011,  the  US 
wireless industry gained almost 1.6 million new 
jobs  while  total  private  sector  jobs  fell  by  5.3 
million.  
Against this background, net neutrality seems to 
have  become  for  Europe  one  of  the  only 
solutions  left  to  trigger  investment  in  new 
infrastructure  without  fully  repealing  its 
telecoms  package,  and  avoiding  a  fight  with 
member states on a fully centralised, and more 
dynamic, spectrum policy for mobile telephony. 
However,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  proposed  rule 
will be easily applicable in practice, nor does it 
seem to be a suitable way to achieve the long-
awaited single market for telecoms (Pelkmans & 
Renda, 2012). Hence, back to square one: how do 
we ensure that Europe gets back on track with 
broadband and, as a result, restores one of the 
key building blocks of future competitiveness?  
To be sure, the answer cannot rely only on the 
trade-off  between  a  largely  inapplicable  net 
diversity  rule  and  a  largely  undesirable  (if 
coupled  with  access  policy) net  neutrality  rule. 
At the same time, the answer cannot rely only on 
competition law, and in particular on what Art. 
102  TFEU  prescribes  in  terms  of  abuse  of 
dominance: the ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’ test 
current  applied  by  DG  COMP  to  exclusionary 
abuses is very difficult to interpret and apply to 
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applications  and  content.  Thus,  ironically 
enough, perhaps the main (if not unique) virtue 
of  a  mandatory  net  neutrality  rule  is  that  it 
provides more clarity and certainty than any net 
diversity  rule,  coupled  with  extensive 
monitoring  and  patrolling  of  QoS  on  the 
Internet.  
Faced  with  this impasse,  in my  opinion  the  EU 
should  attempt  to  shift  gears  by  adopting  a 
number of new, courageous initiatives. First, the 
EU  should  launch  a  ‘grand  project’  on 
infrastructure,  aiming  at  enhanced  integration 
between existing large players in the fixed and 
wireless sector in Europe, and between them and 
other utilities (e.g. electricity companies, in view 
of  the  deployment  of  smart  grids):  this  move 
should be coupled with a more flexible approach 
to wholesale access, with high-speed broadband 
being potentially exempt if the company respects 
basic canons of fairness in pricing and activism 
in new investment. This ‘grand project’ could be 
launched  explicitly  during  the  upcoming  mid-
term review of the Europe2020 strategy, together 
with other two large initiatives on education and 
employment  (I  will  get  back  to  this  issue  in  a 
future commentary). 
Second,  priority  given  to  infrastructure  should 
also mean that EU budget resources and national 
funds  should  be  reoriented  towards 
infrastructure  to  a  large  extent.  Third,  the  EU 
should  multiply  efforts  to  convince  member 
states that the allocation of spectrum should be 
more centralised in certain bands (e.g. 700 MHz) 
and tightly coordinated in others (e.g. unlicensed 
spectrum for wi-fi) As I have already mentioned 
in past commentaries, a pan-European spectrum 
auction seems to be the only way for the EU to 
‘erase and rewind’ after a decade of unnecessary, 
systematic fragmentation of the wireless market, 
and move towards the creation of pan-European, 
strong mobile operators that can negotiate more 
balanced conditions with giant mobile platform 
providers.  Fourth,  a  list  of  reasonable  traffic 
management  and  data  management  practices 
should  be  developed  in  cooperation  with 
industry and in alignment with US rules (this is 
likely  to  become  a  hot  issue  during  the  TTIP 
negotiations): we cannot afford to keep divergent 
rules  in  the  age  of  the  global  Internet  and 
emerging  new  platforms.  Fifth,  the  creation  of 
separate networks that do not rely on the global 
Internet  should  be  made  possible  (along  the 
‘Comcast’  model  in  the  US),  subject  to  clear 
competition rules. 
Sixth,  the  application  of  competition  rules  and 
the interpretation of the concept of neutrality in 
cyberspace  should  be  clarified  through  a  joint 
communication  of  DG  COMP  and  DG 
CONNECT,  to  be  subject  to  extensive 
consultation.  Otherwise,  the  net  neutrality 
investigation and the Google investigation might 
end up leaving the whole Internet ecosystem in a 
state  of  uncertainty:  internet  providers,  cloud 
providers, search providers, Operating Systems 
developers will not know whether, should they 
succeed  in  the  market,  a  public  authority  will 
knock at their door with some intrusive requests 
that end up disrupting their business model.  
Finally, ISPs should simply be made responsible 
for guaranteeing the speed they advertise, users 
should be empowered with measurement tools, 
and in case of gross, systematic deviation from 
the  promised  speed,  they  should  be  given 
speedy online redress procedures.  
These rules, altogether and coupled with a pro-
active approach to skills and employment, might 
lead  Europe  back  on  track  in  the  global 
competitiveness  race  and  will  provide  the 
Internet ecosystem with a long-awaited sense of 
legal  certainty.  This  approach  also  does  not 
require  intensive  monitoring  and  straight-
jacketing of the Internet, nor acrobatic efforts to 
communicate  to  consumers  which  throttling 
measures are envisaged in a given network, and 
not  even  heroic  definitions  such  as  minimum 
QoS,  disruption  of  the  open  Internet,  and  the 
sort.  To  be  sure  cyberspace  will  remain  the 
domain of diversity – but this privilege will be 
left to those layers that have shown to be much 
less stable and more transient in the past years, 
compared  with  the  more  stable  infrastructure 
layer.  
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